Foundational Constraints

Purpose of This Document

This document defines the foundational constraints under which Common Trust for Music (“the Trust”) operates.

These constraints exist to:

• limit the accumulation of unchecked power
• prevent enclosure and extraction
• preserve credible exit for participants
• bind future stewards as well as current ones

This document is restrictive by design.

Core Premise

The Trust is founded on the following premise:

Digital infrastructure that becomes successful must be constrained against its own success.

History shows that systems intended to serve the public interest often degrade once they achieve scale, particularly when:

• users become locked in
• rules can be changed unilaterally
• exit becomes costly or impractical

These constraints are intended to prevent that degradation.

Scope of Authority

These constraints apply to:

• all trustees, stewards, and governing bodies
• all Trust-held assets (digital, financial, or intellectual)
• all systems, tools, and infrastructure stewarded by the Trust
• all successor entities or governance arrangements

Constraint One: Power Must Remain Contestable

No individual or body may exercise unilateral authority over systems that others depend on.

Accordingly:

• Material changes to rules, access, ranking, remuneration, or data use must be subject to defined governance processes.
• Those materially affected by a change must have a formal mechanism to contest it.
• Silence or inaction may not be interpreted as consent.

The legitimacy of decisions is treated as a prerequisite for scale.

Constraint Two: Exit Must Remain Credible

The Trust recognises exit as a primary safeguard against abuse.

Accordingly:

• Participation in Trust-stewarded systems must be voluntary.
• No participant may be structurally prevented from leaving.
• Switching costs must remain survivable, not punitive.

Exit must be:

• legally permitted
• technically feasible
• practically achievable without disproportionate loss

Constraint Three: Portability by Design

Data, content, and participation must not be enclosed.

Accordingly:

• Participants retain rights over their own contributed data.
• Data must be exportable in documented, usable formats.
• Proprietary formats that prevent migration must be avoided.

Portability is treated as a first-class design requirement.

Constraint Four: Forking Is a Legitimate Outcome

The Trust recognises forking as a safeguard, not a failure.

Accordingly:

• Forking of Trust-stewarded code, data, or governance patterns is legally permitted.
• Forking must not be obstructed through licensing, contractual, or technical means.
• Shared assets may not be weaponised to punish or deter exit.

Where appropriate, conditions under which a fork is justified must be documented.

Constraint Five: No Permanent Rent Extraction

The Trust exists to enable contribution, not to extract ongoing rents.

Accordingly:

• No contribution may confer perpetual economic rights.
• Remuneration for contribution must be:
  • proportional to measurable benefit
  • time-bound
  • capped
• Early contributors may not entrench structural advantage.

This constraint applies to both financial and non-financial forms of extraction.

Constraint Six: Governance Is Infrastructure

Governance is treated as a core system, not an advisory layer.

Accordingly:

• Governance mechanisms must be explicit, documented, and testable.
• Decision-making processes must be knowable to participants.
• Governance failure is treated as system failure, not behavioural failure.

Informal power is considered a governance risk.

Constraint Seven: Speed Is Governable

The Trust rejects the assumption that speed is inherently beneficial.

Accordingly:

• Participants must have a formal mechanism to slow change when legitimacy is contested.
• A defined minority of affected participants may trigger a slowdown process (“brakes”).
• During such periods:
  • irreversible changes are paused
  • justification and impact analysis must be published
  • counter-proposals must be considered

The burden of proof shifts to those proposing continued acceleration.

Constraint Eight: Assets Are Held for Public Benefit

All assets stewarded by the Trust are held for the benefit of local music ecosystems.

Accordingly:

• Assets may not be sold or transferred for private enrichment.
• Asset use must align with the Trust’s stated purpose.
• Stewardship must prioritise long-term ecosystem health over short-term gain.

This applies to:

• domains
• data
• code
• design
• financial resources

Constraint Nine: Anti-Capture Measures

The Trust recognises the risk of institutional capture.

Accordingly:

• Trustees and stewards are subject to term limits.
• Conflicts of interest must be disclosed and managed.
• External audit or review may be triggered under defined conditions.

Concentration of decision-making power is treated as a systemic risk.

Constraint Ten: Local Autonomy Is Preserved

The Trust exists to support multiple local music ecosystems.

Accordingly:

• No local ecosystem is required to adopt Trust-stewarded systems.
• Adoption does not imply loss of local autonomy.
• Local adaptation and divergence are explicitly permitted.

The Trust does not function as a central authority over local culture.

Amendment of Constraints

These constraints are intended to bind future stewards.

Accordingly:

• Amendments require elevated thresholds of consent.
• Amendments must be publicly documented with rationale.
• Amendments may not remove or materially weaken:
  • exit rights
  • portability guarantees
  • contestability of power
  • legitimacy of forking

Any attempt to remove these protections constitutes grounds for fork or dissolution.

Dissolution and Failure

The Trust recognises that failure is possible.

Accordingly:

• If the Trust can no longer serve its purpose without violating these constraints, dissolution is preferable to capture.
• In the event of dissolution, assets must be transferred to arrangements that preserve these principles as closely as possible.

Failure must be visible, contestable, and reversible — not silent or extractive.

Closing Statement

This document exists to constrain behaviour.

It assumes:

• incentives drift
• power accumulates
• good intentions are insufficient

The Common Trust for Music is therefore governed not by trust in individuals, but by structures that make abuse difficult and accountability unavoidable.